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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GARY D. ACKER,

Case No.
12268

Defendant and Appellant.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Appellant, Gary D. Acker, appeals the constitutionality
of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107 .8 (a) ( 19 53 ), operating a motorcycle upon a public highway posted for a speed
higher than 35 miles per hour without wearing protective
headgear, and a finding of guilty.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted and sentenced m the
Ogden City Court and appealed that city court conviction to
the Second District Court, Weber County, State of Utah. The
Second District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presid-
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ing, upheld the conviction and found Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953) constitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully requests the court to set aside
the conviction on the grounds that the statute under which
he was convicted is unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was convicted and sentenced m the
Ogden City Court of Ogden City, County of Weber, Utah, for
having operated a motorcycle upon a public highway posted
for a speed higher than 35 miles per hour without wearing a
protective headgear which complied with standard established
by the Utah Commissioner of Public Safety, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953), which
reads:
No person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle upon a public
highway posted for speeds higher than 35 miles
per hour, unless he is wearing protective headgear which complies with standards established
by the commissioner of public safety.
The appellant appealed that city court conviction and
sentence and the matter was set for trial de novo in the Second
District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde presiding. The
evidence was stipulated. It was stipulated that the appellant
had been arrested while operating a motorcycle upon a public
highway in a zone posted for speeds higher than 35 miles per
hour, without wearing any protective headgear.

-2-
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The appellant moved the court to dismiss the complaint and discharge the appellant on the grounds that the
evidence failed to prove the appellant had committed any
crime and that Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a)
( 19 53), the statute under which the appellant is charged, is
unconstitutional, void, and of no effect whatsoever. After
hearing oral arguments, the court found the appellant guilty
and the statute constitutional.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THE APPELLANT HAD COMMITTED ANY CRIME.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953),
under which the appellant is charged, reads:
No person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle upon a public
highway posted for speeds higher than 35 miles
per hour, unless he is wearing protective headgear which complies with standards established
by the commissioner or public safety.
Admittedly, the evidence did show that the appellant
operated a motorcycle upon a public highway posted for
speeds higher than 35 miles per hour without wearing protective headgear; however, there was no evidence whatsoever as
proof of the last required element of the alleged offense, i.e.,
noncompliance with standards established by the commissioner of public safety.

-3-
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To date, the appellant is unaware of and unable to
find any standards in this area that have been established by
the commissioner of public safety. Relying on the fact that
no such standards exist, the state is unable to prove every
element of the alleged offense. Without being able to show a
violation of such standards, the complaint should be dismissed
and the appellant discharged.
POINT II
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 41-6-107.8
(a) (1953), UNDER WHICH THE APPELLANT IS CHARGED,
VIOLATES THE FIFTH, NINTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED ST ATES CONSTITUTION
IN THAT IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER OF THE ST ATE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC WELFARE; IT IS AN UNREASONABLE INFRINGEMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE RIGHT TO THE FREE
USE OF ONE'S PROPERTY; AND ITS STANDARDS ARE
TOO VAGUE AND INDEFINITE TO BE ENFORCEABLE.
Motorcycle helmet regulations are of comparatively
recent origin and typically provide that operators and passengers of motorcycles and motor scooters must wear protective helmets of a type approved by a state agency.
Such regulations reflect a widespread effort to combat
the rising death and injury toll of accidents in which motorcyclists are involved.
The courts have reached different results as to the
constitutional validity of the helmet law in those jurisdictions
in which the issue has been raised. In some cases, courts have
upheld motorcycle helmet regulations as a legitimate exercise
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of the police power of the state to legislate for the promotion
of the general health, safety, and welfare, pointing out, in
effect, that without helmets, motorcyclists are particularly
vulnerable to being struck in the head by loose stones kicked
up by wheels, which may cause such injury or distraction to
the operator as could result in loss of his control of the motorcycle, thereby endangering other users of the public highways.
On the other hand, there is authority to the effect
that the helmet regulations are unconstitutional because they
do not bear a substantial relationship to the protection of the
general public but serve only to protect the individual motorcycle operator from himself.
So far as can be determined, this case is of first impression in Utah. Michigan, ~merica_B_Motorcyc_k__Ass'n v.
Q~\j_ds, 158 N.W. 2d 72 (1968); Illinois, Illinois v. fries, 250
N.E. 2d 149 (1969), and Ohio, State v. Betts, 252, N.E. 2d
266 ( 1969 ), have held helmet statutes to be unconstitutional.
The New Yark circuit court of appeals has split decisions on
this type of law. People v. Small~_ood, 271 N.Y.S. 2d 429,
(1967) has held the helmet statute to be unconstitutional
while Peyele v. ~iel~er., 282 N.Y.S. 2d 797 (1969), has
held it to be constitutional. As far as can be determined, the
New York Supreme Court has not made a decision.
It is conceded that a majority of the cases have held
helmet statutes to be constitutional. See _g~~hardt v. Ne~
Orleans, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968); State v. Laite_Bl!!., 459 P. 2d
789 (1969); ~tate_v. _E,itel 227 So. 2d 489 (1969); ~~te v.
Albertson, 470 P. 2d 300, (1970); Lav~ v. ~ill., 465 P. 2d 118
(1970), and others.

-5-
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In all of the recent challenges, the questions were
whether such laws were too vague and indefinite to be enforceable, or were an unreasonable infringement of individual
liberty.
If either of the above challenges to this type of statute
is valid, then fundamental rights are being denied by the states
without due process of law as provided for in the Fifth, Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...
The Ninth Amendment provides:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparge others retained by the
people.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of dtize-ns of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
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The power of the state is the power vested in the legislature to enact laws not repugnant to the Constitution which
shall protect the public health, safety and welfare. State ex
~l Co~ v. Board of Education of S.L.C., 21 Utah 401. The
police power of the state extends only to the protection of
public health, public safety, and public welfare and insures
each individual an uninterrupted enjoyment of the rights and
privileges conferred on him by law. Nebbi~ v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934). Insofar as the police power is utilized by
the state, the means employed to effect its exercise may be
neither arbitrary nor oppressive, but must bear a real and substantial relation to an end which is public. The ancient maxim
"sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (so use your own that
you do not injure that of another) has often been cited as one
of the essential bases of the police power. In this regard, the
protection of the public welfare through past application of
the police power has been limited to instances where one individual's conduct adversely affected others, not merely his
own. To uphold Utah's helmet statute would represent an
extension of the limits of the police power to include the regulation of an individual's conduct where he alone could be
adversely affected.
Let us now compare the arguments supporting and
opposing helmet statutes.

A.

Public Welfare threatened.

The arguments favoring helmet statues are based
on the contention that the public welfare is endangered by
the unhelmeted rider. Courts upholding helmet statutes have
relied on one or a combination of propositions based on this

-7-
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theory. In State v. Lombardi, 241 A 2d 625 (1968), the court
suggests that the injured rider will become a burden on
society and holds that the legislature is not powerless to prohibit individuals from pursuing a course of conduct which
could conceivably result in their becoming public charges. In
addition to being a potential case for public economic assistance, the disabled rider will be unable to add his fair share to
the productivity of society. On this point, the court in £.~le
v. Carmichael, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 931, (1968) stated: "It is to the
interest of the state to have strong, robust, healthy citizens
capable of self-support, of bearing arms, and of adding to the
resources of the country."
Of course, the fallacy of propositions such as these is
glaringly magnified when the same logic is applied to other
frailties of human beings. Should the state through the exercise of its police power be able to criminally punish individuals
who expose themselves to diseases or to other injurious accidents? Of course not! Surely America is not on the road of
agreement with Hitler and his concepts of the perfect race
whereby the weak and afflicted are annihilated.
B.

Direct Benefit to Others.

In contrast to those benefits accruing to the
individual cyclist and thus to the whole of society, some courts
have found in helmet statutes a legislative intent to confer
direct benefits to certain classes of citizens, specifically, highway users. Since the rider is in an exposed position, it has
been suggested by some courts that flying stones or bugs
might strike the unhelmeted rider's head, causing loss of control, thereby endangering pedestrians or other motorists.
State v. Lombardi, supra.

-8-
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If
and equal
worn by
not fully
C.

this reasoning were sound, a uniform application
protection of laws would also require helmets to be
riders in convertibles or other vehicles that were
enclosed and protected from such objects.
Power to Control Use of Highways

The position that the use of the public highways
is a privilege, not a right, is assumed by some courts to justify
helmet laws as a valid exercise of state police power. Commonwealth v.l:_f_S?wi~ 238 N.E. 2d 373 (1968). Even though the
use of the public highways may be only a conditional privilege
subject to state control, the state may not exercise this power
arbitarily. Wall v. Kin~, 206 F. 2d 878 (1953). The legislature
must still determine that the public welfare is endangered and
must reasonably exercise the police powers to meet that public
need.
D.

Equipment Regulation.

The final contention favoring helmet statutes
sees them as simply equipment regulations, similar to those
requiring seat belts and other safety devices; therefore, no
problem of individual liberty is involved. While, however,
nearly every state requires that new automobiles be equipped
with seat belts, no state has gone so far as to demand on penal
sanctions that they must be worn.
Requiring manufacturers to equip vehicles with safety
devices is substantially different from requiring an individual
to do something protective about his personal welfare alone.
This distinctiction is crucial and is the basis of the counter
arguments that the helmet statutes are unconstitutional.

-9-
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Arguments Opposing Statutes
A.

Infringement of Individual Liberty.

The central argument challenges the constitutionality of helmet statutes on the ground that only the individual
and not the public welfare is endangered. Hence, the state
should not invoke its police powers. American Motorcycl~
Ass'n. v . .Qavids, Supra.
Freedom of choice, if that choice does not
affect the public welfare, includes the right
to make what the majority believes to be the
wrong or unintelligent choice, as well as the
right or intelligent choice. For if the majority
can set itself up to judge, in matters of individual welfare, between right and wrong, and
enforce those judgments with criminal sanctions, then all areas of personal liberty will be
jeopardized.
The police power does not undertake to protect the individual against his own acts, partly
because that would involve an inquisitorial
control over private life and conduct both
intolerable and unenforceable, partly because
police power ought not and is not intended to
be a substitute for individual self-control and
responsibility but finds its proper sphere in
guarding against evils and dangers beyond the
control of him whom they threaten. The right
to choose one course of action even to the extent of incurring risks where others are not
concerned is a part of individual liberty. E.
Freund, The Police Power, Public Policy and
Constitutional Rights. Section 15 5 ( 1904).
Similarly, to allow this type of regulation is to open
the door to an unlimited benevolent parternalism of govern-
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ment which would surely be inimical to our democratic way
of life and our constitutionally protected liberties.
The court in American Motorcycle Ass'!!_ v. Davids,
Supra. held the helmet statute to be unconstitutional as an
invalid exercise of the state's police power, since it has no relationship to public safety. The court stated:
It is contended by the plaintiff that the legislative concern is solely related to the safety
of the motorcyclist and passenger and can have
no possible relationship to the safety and wellbeing of other persons, much less the public
at large.
There can be no doubt that the state has a substantial
interest in highway safety. In Smith v. Wayne Co. Sheriff,
278 Mich. 91, 96 (1936), the court said, "It is well settled
that the legislature has the power to control and regulate the
use of the highways." but the difficulty with adopting this as
a basis for decision is that it would also justify a requirement
that automobile drivers wear helmets or buckle their seat
belts for their own protection.
These arguments all prove too much.
In a series of decisions, this court has held that
even though the governmental purpose be ligitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved.
The plaintiff relies also upon the reserved powers
under the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution
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and cites the recent decision in Greswold
- - - - v. Connecticut
______ ,
381 U.S. 479, (1965 ), wherein Justice Goldberg, concurring,
invoked this amendment to invalidate a Connecticut statute
making the use of contraceptives by the individual user a private right of the individual free from state coercion and control, and equated this right with the right to be let alone.
Justice Brandeis stated this principle in Olmstea_Q. v. Colorad_g,
277 U.S. 438, (1928).
B.

Legislative Intent Solely to Protect Rider.

Courts which have struck down helmet statutes
find a clear and single legislative purpose is to afford the rider
an added degree of protection in case of mishaps. This view
tends to deny that such statutes act to directly benefit other
users of the highways.
Suggesting that the problem of loss of control due to
flying stones or bugs was not intended to be met by helmet
statutes, the court in State v. Betts, Supra, stated:

It is said that the wearing of a mask and
helmet might well prevent a stone or bug from
hitting a cyclist in the face, causing him to lose
control of his cycle, swerve into the oncoming
traffic lane and cause a grievous accident. This
court is of the opinion that to uphold the
statute under such reasoning would torture
logic beyond its limits.
C.

Detrimental Effects of Helmets.

Courts have raised another point to invalidate a
mandatory helmet statute. Rather than being beneficial, it is
contended that the wearing of a crash helmet tends to impair
the rider's vision and hearing. This impairment makes the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rider less aware of what is occurring around him and, therefore, more of a menace to others on the highways.
D.

Statutes Too Vague and Indefinite to be Enforced.

The final argument posed in opposition to helmet statutes is that statutory standards are too vague and
indefinite to inform the cyclist of what is required of him.
If the standards are not sufficiently clear and available to the cyclist, conviction for violating such a statute
would constitute deprivation of liberty without due process
of law.
U. S. Constitution Amendment VI, provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation ...
"The effect of the clause entitling an accused
to know the nature and cause of accusation
against him commences with the statutes fixing or declaring offenses. It adopts the general
rule of common law that such statutes are not
to be construed to embrace offenses which are
not within their intentions and terms." See
UniteU~t~ v. LCohen_Qr_ocery_~Q., 264
F. 218, aff'd. 255 U.S. 81 (1921 ).
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953),
under which the defendant is charged in the instant case,
merely refers to standards established by the commissioner
of public safety. No such standards were in evidence, and no
such standards have been made available to the defendant.
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POINT III
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 41-6-107.8
(a) (1953), UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED, VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
ST ATES CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT IS ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS'.
The rule is well settled that a state may classify persons
and objects for the purpose of legislation. District of Columbia v. BrQ9ke, 218 U.S. 138. This is not sufficient to relieve a
statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment however. One of the essential requirements as
to classification, is that it must not be capricious or arbitrary,
but must have a rational basis.
Utah's helmet statute is only concerned with those
motorcyclists who are upon public highways posted for speeds
in excess of 35 miles per hour. No other state has this added
provision. Such classification is arbitrary and has no rational
basis when considered in light of the other arguments. It has
no relationship to the act of the person, but the particular
highway he may be on.
The effect of this prov1s1on then makes the law
applicable only to certain members of the class of people who
ride motorcycles. When law involves classification, it must
effect alike, all persons in the same class. Duncan v. Missouit
153 U.S. 377. In the case of Utah's helmet statute, if a person
who rides a motorcycle, lives in an area surrounded only by
highways, he is absolutely precluded from riding his motorcycle without a helmet. The person who lives in a residential
area however, has much greater freedom to ride his motorcycle.
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Because of the arbitrary nature of the law, the entire
law must be declared void.

CONCLUSION
The court should grant the defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant for the
reasons stated in this brief on the grounds that the plaintiff
has failed to prove the defendant has committed any crime
and that Utah's helmet statute is unconstitutional.
The single legislative intent to protect the individual,
not the public, is made clear by inclusion of the requirement
that the passenger as well as the operator of a motorcycle
wear protective headgear. Injury to the passenger could certainly cause no harm to other motorists on the highways.
Also, this is strengthened by the requirement only being
applicable in areas where the posted speed limit is in excess
of 35 miles per hour.
Utah's helmet statute, inter alia, is an atempt to
unconstitutionally exercise the state's police power and
should be declared invalid, unconstitutional, and of no effect
whatsoever.

Respectfully submitted,
VAN SCIVER, FLORENCE,
HUTCHISON & SHARP
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Appellant
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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